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Abstract  
This article empirically analyses the reasons for crises in microfinance institutions (MFIs), 
using a sample of 832 MFIs from 74 countries for the period 2003-2011. The methodology used 
is logit analysis with panel data. The main results show that both internal and external factors 
influence the probability of a crisis. We find different factors that reduce the likelihood of a 
crisis (company’s performance, country’s economic growth, political stability and existence of 
a private credit bureau). On the other hand, excessive liquidity, a higher proportion of deposits 
over loans and more loans per employee all increase the probability of a crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are a fundamental part of many countries’ financial systems. 
This activity, which began giving loans to people on low incomes based on little more than a 
joint guarantee, has evolved into a major industry offering a wide range of financial products 
and services such as loans, transfers, deposits and microinsurance. 
Because of the importance that this activity has gained1 , many studies have analysed the 
achievements of the most successful microfinance institutions (Ahlin et al., 2006; Kaboski, 
2005; Khandker, 2005; Patten et al., 2001). These studies seek to identify models to be 
replicated and activities that microfinance institutions should follow, since not all have followed 
the same successful path. Some have become big and provided services to a large number of 
clients, such as Grameen Bank, while others are operating on a smaller scale or have even 
disappeared. 
In the study of MFIs’ performance, we can distinguish between two different approaches: the 
financial sustainability on one hand and the social impact (such as poverty reduction or female 
empowerment) on the other (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). However, although studying the 
successful experiences is extremely important, an analysis of failed institutions2 is essential, 
especially when large MFIs have failed and disappeared even after following the best practices 
and recommendations gleaned from the most satisfactory experiences. The past examples of 
the institutions that have disappeared, as well as those that have managed to survive after 
encountering difficulties, are of enormous help in avoiding making the same mistakes again 
today. Studying failure is even more relevant today because the crisis has changed microfinance 
institutions’ structures and business model. Despite the importance of this, there have been few 
studies that have analysed the failure of microfinance institutions. The few that exist focus on 
                                                 
1 According to data from the Microcredit Summit Campaign, on 31 December 2011, the 3,703 microfinance 
institutions that reported data had reached 195 million customers worldwide. 
2 In the study of MFIs’ failure, we have also two different approaches: the lack of financial sustainability on one 
hand and the absence of social impact on the other. 
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a descriptive study of specific cases. Although these provide very relevant information, they 
cannot be easily generalized. Stegee (1998) discusses the failure of the Colombian Corposol 
institution and how its inadequate growth and structure led it to an unsustainable situation. 
Marulanda et al. (2010) analysed 10 microfinance institutions in Latin America that failed. Out 
of all of the lessons he gleans, he stresses that the way the institution’s management team 
addresses the issues is critical in these situations. Rozas (2011) extends the previous work done 
by Marulanda, making an in-depth analysis of the failure of 10 other microfinance institutions 
located in different parts of the world. The main recommendations he puts forward are to face 
the problems with determination, avoid panic and seek external advice. 
In this context, the main contribution from our work is to carry out, for the first time, a study to 
identify the factors leading to the failure of microfinance institutions, by using an econometric 
analysis of the probability of MFI crisis. This probability of crisis is defined as the possibility 
that an institution may have financial problems. The second contribution from this work is that 
the analysis is carried out on a large number of MFIs, and not only for specific cases. That 
allows comparing healthy MFIs with those that are in crisis. Unlike previous studies, this study 
also analyses the effect that the macroeconomic and institutional situation of the countries in 
which the MFIs operate has on the probability of a crisis, thereby giving us the third 
contribution from this work. The econometric analysis and the large sample size enable the 
results obtained to be generalized easily, which did not occur in previous works that addressed 
only specific cases. The innovation proposed in the paper is to suggest early warning systems 
which microfinance organisations and regulatory authorities can use to minimise the likelihood 
of a crisis occurring, by analogy with the early warning systems proposed for banks and national 
governments (e.g. special issue of 'Journal of Economic Perspectives', April 1998; special issue 
of 'Journal of International Development' (vol 25 no 8), December 2013). 
The empirical analysis is carried out on a sample of 832 MFIs from 74 countries during the 
period 2003-2011. By choosing this large sample size, it is possible to analyse both the specific 
characteristics of the microfinance institutions themselves and the macroeconomic variables 
and institutional characteristics of the country in which they are located. To carry out the 
empirical analysis, a panel data logit regression is applied. The main results of the study show 
that the institutions with greater profitability are less likely to have difficulties. Moreover, 
institutions with greater liquidity, higher proportion of deposits over loans and more loans per 
employee are more likely to have a crisis. Additionally, the economic growth of the country in 
which the MFI operates, political stability and the existence of a private credit bureau reduce 
the probability of a crisis. 
The rest of the work is organized as follows. In section 2, the factors influencing the failure of 
MFIs are explained. In section 3, the sample is defined, the methodology used in the study is 
explained, and the results obtained are presented. The study ends with the conclusions and 
bibliographical references. 
2. The difficulties of microfinance institutions 
When we analyse the success of an MFI, we should consider the ultimate goals of a MFI: the 
first one is to serve as many poor people as possible and the second one is its own financial 
sustainability. The debate between the two approaches has not been concluded yet, although 
the most recent microfinance paradigm seems to favour the financial approach (Hermes and 
Lensink, 2007). In addition, it is difficult to establish a definition of failure that appears as a 
result of a failure to achieve financial and social results at the same time. For this reason, the 
existing studies focused, as we are doing in this one, on the achievement of financial results 
(Marulanda et al. 2010; Rozas, 2011). In this regard, the financial failure of these institutions 
may be caused by internal and external factors (Navajas and Villacorta, 2012).  
2.1- Internal factors 
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Internal factors refers to the very characteristics of MFIs, such as their organizational design, 
staffing structure, products sold, and so on. These factors are often the most decisive in 
determining an MFI’s financial position, but they are also relevant because they are controlled 
by the institutions themselves. Below, we review the main factors that reflect the status and 
structure of an MFI and which may influence their probability of crisis.   
– Size of loan: The average size of loans granted by an institution is indicative of its 
customers’ average income. The smaller the loan, the lower its customers’ income level 
will be. The relationship between this variable and the probability of crisis in an MFI 
can be either positive or negative. On the one hand, a lower average loan size is expected 
to lead to higher risk. In other words, granting microloans for very small amounts can 
attract customers with greater difficulties in repaying the loans (Roslan and Karim, 
2009). On the other hand, a bigger average loan size is also expected to lead to a higher 
risk. This is because borrowers who bear higher repayment instalments are more likely 
to default (Guttman, 2008, Eze and Ibekwe, 2007). In this regard, Sharma and Zeller 
(1997) explain that if a project fails, the borrower bearing higher repayment instalments 
will have more difficulty in meeting their repayment obligations. 
– Excess liquidity: Greater liquidity provides greater security, but too much can lead to 
higher risk loans. An MFI with high liquidity may be tempted to encourage rapid 
growth, especially in terms of the number of borrowers per branch (González, 2010). A 
rapid rise in microloans, driven by excess liquidity, may relax restrictions on granting 
these loans. This easing of restrictions will cause an increase in the default rate 
(Cermeño et al., 2011). Therefore, it is expected that excess liquidity will be positively 
related to the probability of crisis in a MFI. 
– Deposit-loan ratio: Lenders will increase disbursements of credit and/or relax credit 
constraints if they perceive an increase in deposits over total loans, which could increase 
the probability of a crisis (Cermeño et al., 2011). 
– Interest rate applied by the institution: The relationship between this variable and the 
probability of crisis in an MFI can be either positive or negative. On the one hand, at a 
higher interest rate, customers will have more difficulties in repaying their loans, and 
this will result in higher default rates (Cermeño et al., 2011). On the other hand, MFIs 
can avoid the problem of adverse selection by charging high interest rates (González, 
2007). In this case, if the interest rate increases, the risk of default decreases; that is, the 
probability of failure decreases.  
– Number of borrowers per employee: This variable is used to approximate the MFI 
staff’s workload. The higher the staff’s workload, the less time they have to study each 
customer, which will increase the risk in these transactions and therefore lead to a 
greater probability of crisis in the institution (González, 2007; González, 2010; 
Wilhelm, 2000).  
– Profitability: Increased profitability is the result of better management, best practices, 
lower costs, and so on. Thus, higher profitability leads to less probability of crisis. In 
the microfinance sector, profitability is usually achieved after years of hard work that 
enable management techniques to be honed and adapted to the target market (Marulanda 
et al., 2010).  
– Size of the MFI: The effect of size on the probability of crisis can be twofold. Firstly, 
the size of the institution may be a reflection of its success and good practices. This is 
because the institutions that are better managed with lower costs are able to attract more 
customers and increase their market share (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1976). Therefore, 
larger institutions have a lower probability of crisis as a result of their better 
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management. On the other hand, growth that is too fast can lead to major imbalances 
within an MFI (Steege, 1998, Marulanda et al., 2010). These imbalances may lead to 
less efficiency, unsuitable loans being granted, and a lack of control over these. 
Therefore, a large size may also increase the probability of an MFI crisis.  
2.2- External factors 
The context in which a microfinance institution operates is also an important factor that can 
affect its financial health. The crisis in an MFI is a complex event whose interpretation is 
hampered by numerous external factors. Previous literature has found that the macroeconomic 
and institutional characteristics of the country in which it is located, as well as local events or 
factors of contagion, are often crucial to the survival of an MFI (Vanroose and D’Espallier, 
2013; Ahlin et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2010; Reille, 2009; Patten et al., 2001). 
Below, we review the main factors that may influence the probability of failure, grouped into 
macroeconomic variables and institutional variables.   
Macroeconomic variables 
– Region: Certain characteristics of MFIs vary depending on the geographic region where 
they are located (Pereira and Mourao, 2012; Bogan, 2012, Ahlin et al., 2011, Vanroose 
and D’Espallier, 2013). Maturities, the average loan, the profit margin, the number of 
borrowers per institution and the percentage of women tend to be different depending 
on the geographic region being studied. These differences can be of significant 
importance in business models of MFIs and also in their financial health.  
– Economic growth: Economic growth is a good indicator of the economic health of a 
country and its technological and institutional progress (Vanroose and D’Espallier, 
2013; Ahlin et al., 2011; González, 2010; Kappel et al., 2010.). In this sense, the 
incomes of companies and families are higher in favourable economic situations, so that 
economic growth will reduce the probability of a microfinance institution failing due to 
a drop in defaults.  
– Remittances: Households receiving remittances have a higher income to cope with 
their microcredit repayments, so a greater flow of remittances lowers the default rate 
that microfinance institutions have to bear (Ahlin et al., 2011; Kappel et al., 2010). 
Institutional variables 
– Level of competition in the microfinance sector: the microfinance sector has low 
barriers to entry. If there is a lot of competition it will be difficult to maintain customers’ 
loyalty and payment incentives. Thus, competition could lead to excessively high loans 
being granted and a relaxation of the criteria for granting loans in order to avoid losing 
customers. Such actions will increase clients’ indebtedness and therefore the portfolio 
at risk and the write-off of MFIs (Wilhelm, 2000; Chen et al., 2010; and Vogelgesang, 
2003).  
– Depth of the financial system: The depth of the financial system may have a positive 
or negative effect on the MFIs’ situation. On the one hand, greater depth in the financial 
system complements the microfinance sector because it fosters incentives to keep up 
good credit records and opens up ways for micro-companies to go further than 
microcredit (Ahlin et al., 2011). On the other hand, a greater depth in the financial 
system may make it difficult for the microfinance sector to develop because the two 
sectors will enter into direct competition. This competition would lead to lending with 
fewer restrictions and for greater amounts, which in turn would lead the customers to 
greater indebtedness and therefore to an increase in the rate of default (Vanroose and 
D’Espallier, 2013).  
– Governance indicators: Political instability and corruption may shorten planning 
horizons and affect borrowers’ ability and capacity to pay loans back (Kappel et al., 
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2010). In other words, countries with political instability and high levels of corruption 
may create disincentives for customers to pay back loans. 
– Information exchange system: This is measured as a private credit bureau, that is, the 
number of people and companies listed in a private credit registry. The existence of 
efficient systems for exchanging information about the indebtedness of borrowers 
improves the control that MFIs have over their loans. Moreover, these systems also 
improve the quality of portfolios with outstanding debt (Padilla and Pagano, 2000; 
Jappelli and Pagano, 2000; Luoto et al., 2007; Ahlin et al., 2011). This requires the time 
it takes a lender to access information about the borrower not to be too long, because 
otherwise the system’s effectiveness is reduced (Kappel et al., 2010). In addition, 
information exchange systems have a disciplinary effect on borrowers, creating 
incentives to repay loans (Padilla and Pagano, 2000). If borrowers are aware of the 
existence of a credit information system, they will be more likely to repay loans (Kappel 
et al., 2010). 
– Strength of legal rights: Generally, greater protection of the legal rights of borrowers 
and lenders helps reduce failed loans from MFIs. So, MFIs operating in these countries 
are less likely to have a crisis. However, Ahlin et al. (2011) found that in some cases, 
greater legal protection can encourage lending to higher risk customers. This could lead 
to an increase in bad debts, so this variable could also have a negative effect on the 
probability of an MFI crisis. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1- Sample  
The sample used for the empirical analysis consists of 4,463 observations of 832 MFIs from 74 
countries between 2003 and 2011, which have at least three consecutive years of data. 
Given the variety of factors considered, four different databases have been used in this study. 
On the one hand, Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) provides information to create 
specific variables for microfinance institutions. On the other hand, World Development 
Indicators, World Governance Indicators and Doing Business provide macroeconomic and 
institutional variables. 
Table 1 shows how the MFIs used in our analysis are mostly in Asia and Latin America, 
whereas Table 2 shows that the institutions most prevalent in the market are Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and Non-Banking Financial Institutions (NBFIs), with 39.65 percent 
and 34.79 per cent respectively.  
TABLES 1 & 2 
3.2- Methodology 
In this study we perform an analysis to test the effect that each of the factors analysed has on 
the probability of a crisis. To do this, a qualitative response model for discrete dependent 
variables is applied, since this type of data does not allow the classical regression model to be 
used. 
The model is approached in terms of probability and is estimated using a logit analysis with 
panel data. The presence of unobserved heterogeneity may lead to biased results in the 
coefficients if a traditional estimation is made for maximum likelihood. To overcome this 
limitation, in this study an estimation is made using panel data, which is robust in the presence 
of unobserved heterogeneity and thus allows more efficient results to be obtained. In addition, 
discrete choice panel data models removed the bias of omitted variables that appears when 
unobserved individual effects are correlated with the explanatory variables (Pindado et al., 
2008). 
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This study presents different models through a logit analysis with random effects, using the 
effect of the internal variables of the MFIs, the macroeconomic variables, and the institutional 
variables. The generic form of the models used is as follows: 
𝐿𝑂𝐺 (
𝑃(𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆)
𝑃(𝑁𝑂 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆)
) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑗𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡    (1) 
Where β0, βj, βk, βl are the coefficients of the model, MFIit the internal variables of each 
microfinance institution each year, MACROit the macroeconomic variables for each country 
each year, INSTit the institutional variables for each country each year, dt the time-specific 
effect, ηi the individual effect, and υit the random error. 
Hence, the complete model follows this specification: 
𝐿𝑂𝐺 (
𝑃(𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆)
𝑃(𝑁𝑂 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆)
) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑌𝐼𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡
6
𝑘=1 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡                                                                       (2) 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if an MFI is in crisis in year t, and 0 otherwise. In the 
microfinance sector, there is no commonly accepted, explicit definition of failure or crisis. 
However, several authors have tried to define it. Firstly, Marulanda et al. (2010) uses the term 
failed experiences when an MFI is suffering serious financial losses that threaten its solvency 
and it needs to capitalize, merge, restructure or close. Secondly, Rozas (2011) uses a more 
technical definition to determine what institutions are in crisis Such institutions in crisis would 
be microfinance institutions with a portfolio at risk for more than thirty days (PAR 30) and 
write-off ratio higher than 20 per cent3. The latter definition will be used in this paper to select 
MFIs that are in crisis. 
Table 3 shows the percentages for institutions in crisis compared to the total sample by region 
and year. We can see the effect the financial crisis has had on the microfinance sector. 
TABLE 3 
The independent variables are those that may have an influence on the probability of a crisis, 
according to the previous literature. These variables, which have previously been explained in 
the review of the literature, are divided into three categories: internal variables, macroeconomic 
variables and institutional variables. Table 4 shows the definition of each variable used in the 
model. 
TABLE 4 
Internal variables 
LSIZE is the natural logarithm of the ratio gross loan portfolio over total number of active 
borrowers (Christen et al., 1995., Christen, 2001; Copestake; 2007; Cull et al., 2007; Cull et al., 
2009, Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007a).  
LIQ refers to the excess liquidity as measured by the bank cash ratio over total assets (Kappel 
et al., 2010, Cermeño et al., 2011).  
DEPLOANS refers to total deposits over the gross loan portfolio (Cermeño et al., 2011).  
YIELD refers to the interest rate applied by the institution. It is calculated by adding income 
from the interest and commissions associated with the loans with respect to the gross loans 
                                                 
3 PAR 30 (portion of portfolio with payments more than 30 days overdue) = ((balance of loans overdue > 30 
days) + (renegotiated portfolio)) / gross loan portfolio.  Write-off ratio = Value of loans written off / average 
gross loan portfolio. 
13 
 
portfolio average, taking into account inflation (Gutiérrez, 2012; Ahlin et al., 2011; Rosenberg 
et al., 2009).  
BORSTAFF represents the number of borrowers each employee is responsible for as measured 
by the number of active borrowers divided by the total staff of the MFI (González, 2007; 
Jansson, 2003). The number of active borrowers refers to individually identifiable borrowers 
who have at least one outstanding loan with the institution. The number of borrowers is used in 
the numerator instead of loans because the number of people served determines the workload 
better than the loans granted (Gutiérrez, 2012). Total staff is defined as the total number of 
people working full time in an MFI.  
ROA is the return on assets calculated as net operating income less taxes, divided by the 
institution’s total assets (Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013; Rosenberg et al., 2009).  
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets of an MFI (Vamroose and D’Espallier, 2013; 
Gutiérrez, 2012; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007b; Mersland and Strom, 2010).  
 Macroeconomic variables 
REGION refers to dummy variables of the region in which the MFI operates. The sample is 
divided into six geographic regions (Africa; East Asia and Pacific; Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; the Middle East and North Africa; and Southern Asia).  
GROWTH is the annual GDP growth per capita of the country in which and MFI operates 
(Ahlin et al., 2011; Ahlin and Lin, 2006; Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013).  
REMIT refers to workers' remittances and compensation of employees as a percentage of GDP 
per capita (Ahlin et al., 2011; Kappel, et al., 2010).  
Institutional variables 
CONCEN represents the degree of competition in the microfinance sector. It is measured using 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which measures the level of concentration in the sector4.  
PCREDIT represents the depth of the financial system measured as domestic credit to the 
private sector as a percentage of GDP (Ahlin et al., 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2004; 
King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Westley, 2001). This ratio represents the 
credit granted by financial institutions to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, excluding 
the credit given by the central bank and development banks, or credit granted to the public 
sector, publicly owned companies and back-to-back loans between groups of intermediaries. 
STAB is the political stability index from the World Governance Indicators database, ranging 
from -2.5 to 2.5; that is, low to high stability (Ahlin et al., 2011). 
CORRUP represents the lack of corruption index from the World Governance Indicators 
database. This indicator ranges from -2.5 to 2.5; in other words, from high to low corruption 
(Ahlin et al., 2011). 
INFOR measures the coverage of the private credit bureau that reports on the number of 
individuals and companies with data in a private credit agency for the last five years of the loan 
history, calculated as a percentage of the adult population, obtained from Doing Business 
database (Ahlin et al., 2011). 
CRIGHTS is the index representing the strength of legal rights from Doing Business database. 
It measures the extent to which laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders, thus facilitating 
lending. This indicator varies between 0 and 10; that is, low to high protection of the rights of 
borrowers and lenders. (Ahlin et al., 2011). 
Tables 5 and 6 show the descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables. 
                                                 
4 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measurement of concentration in a market. The higher the index, 
the more concentrated it is and therefore the less competitive the market. 
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TABLES 5 & 6 
The sample size varies depending on the variables that are being used, due to the heterogeneity 
of the databases used.  
3.3 RESULTS 
The empirical analysis is carried out by estimating four models. The first one only takes into 
account the internal variables of the MFI; in the second, the macroeconomic variables are added 
to the previous model; and in the third and fourth, the institutional variables are included5. Table 
7 shows the results of the four models through logit regression with random effects. 
Regarding the internal variables, the results show that the ROA has a marginal effect that is 
significant and negative in the four estimated models. So, a high return on assets indicates a 
high return in the loan portfolio and that this portfolio is of better quality. This thus also leads 
to lower default rates and less probability of crisis. Both excess liquidity and the ratio of 
deposits to total loans have a positive and significant influence on the probability of crisis in 
the four models. Thus, increases in both variables may cause an increase in lending and/or 
relaxation of credit restrictions, which would increase the rate of defaults. A positive and 
significant relationship is also seen in all the models between the percentage of borrowers per 
employee and crises in microfinance institutions. Institutions with more borrowers per 
employee will have a poorer credit procedure and higher default rates. Finally, a positive and 
significant influence is seen only in model 1, between the average loan size and the probability 
of failure. In this sense, larger loans give a higher probability of default. 
Regarding to macroeconomic and institutional variables, the results show a significant and 
negative relationship in models 2, 3 and 4, between economic growth and the probability of 
                                                 
5 The institutional variables are divided into two models. The first one includes the "political stability" and "lack 
of corruption" variables, which are taken from the World Governance Indicators, with observations for 2003-
2011. The second includes "private credit bureau coverage" and "legal rights" variables, which are taken from 
Doing Business with observations only for 2005-2011. 
crisis in the MFIs. If an economy of a country has a high rate of growth, companies have higher 
rates of profitability and borrowers have more resources to deal with the loan. There is a 
negative and significant relationship in models 3 and 4 between a country’s political stability 
and the likelihood of an MFI crisis. This indicates that microfinance institutions experience 
lower default rates in countries with high political stability. There is a negative and significant 
relationship in model 4 between the private credit bureau and the likelihood of a crisis. This 
relationship shows us the need to build better systems of credit information so as to prevent 
over-indebtedness among borrowers and thus reduce the probability of crisis in microfinance 
institutions. Finally, there is a positive and significant influence only in model 2, for the region 
and the probability of crisis, indicating a slight influence from the geographic region on the 
probability of an MFI crisis. 
4. Conclusions 
This study analyses the factors that influence the probability of a crisis in MFIs. Despite the 
great expansion of microfinance, there are hardly any studies on these institutions’ crises. This 
study analyses these crises for the first time from an econometric perspective, comparing the 
situation of healthy institutions to those that have problems. It also analyses macroeconomic 
and institutional factors that influence the financial health of these institutions. 
The results indicate that the failure of an MFI, measured in terms of a Portfolio at risk and 
loans written-off, is significantly affected not only by internal variables but also by external 
factors, macroeconomic or institutional. 
Regarding the internal factors, the probability of an MFI crisis is negatively related to 
profitability and positively to an excess of resources (too much liquidity and/or too many 
deposits). A high return on assets indicates high returns in a loan portfolio, and thus a better 
quality portfolio. That is, if the institution is managing its loan portfolio properly, this will be 
clearly reflected in its profitability. As for an excess of resources, if there is excess liquidity or 
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a high proportion of deposits compared to total loans, this may cause an increase in credit 
disbursements and/or a relaxation of credit constraints. Therefore, MFIs should bolster their 
mechanisms for granting and managing credit, establishing objective criteria to avoid an 
increase in defaults. 
In addition, the number of borrowers per employee plays an important part in the probability of 
crisis of an MFI. An overworked staff with too many borrowers spends less time studying and 
checking on each client, leading to failures in lending and an increase in the default rate. For 
this reason, it is necessary to have risk control methods adapted to the microfinance sector in 
order to help these organizations’ staff manage their clients and take decisions about lending, 
enabling economies of scale. 
Regarding external factors, the results show that the probability of crisis in a microfinance 
institution is lower, the higher the country’s economic growth. This is because high growth 
leads to higher returns in microcompanies and higher incomes for families, reducing non-
payment of loans. Furthermore, new market niches and opportunities for micro-companies 
appear as a result of the increased demand that comes with economic growth. Lastly, growth 
brings with it better institutions, technological advances and increases in physical and human 
capital. As well as economic growth, political stability is a factor that positively affects MFIs’ 
financial health. 
Finally, information exchange regarding the indebtedness of borrowers helps reduce the 
probability of crises, whether this is due to better control by the MFIs or due to a disciplinary 
effect on the borrowers. Unfortunately, data on credit information exchange systems in 
developing countries are often misleading due to the limitations of any official system over 
informal and semi-formal loans (Jappelli and Pagano, 2000; Luoto et al., 2007). For this reason, 
it is necessary to work on building better credit information systems to help study the borrowers, 
preventing the latter from becoming too indebted, improving MFIs’ loan portfolios,  and 
creating incentives for borrowers to pay back. 
These findings add another element to the debate over the performance of microfinance 
institutions. However, this paper is based on a quantitative perspective, but it would be essential 
to continue with the study of microfinance institutions failure adding qualitative elements to the 
analysis. Although there are some empirical evidence that outreach to the poor is negatively 
related to efficiency of MFIs (Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2011), a more in deep analysis 
of the relationship between MFIs social goals and their success is needed. One future line of 
research on this topic is the analysis of the effect that loyalty has on the performance of MFIs, 
taking into account that customer loyalty is the primary driver of long-term financial success of 
a MFI (Churchill, 2000).   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Sample distribution by region. 
 Total Africa 
East Asia 
 and the 
 Pacific 
Eastern  
Europe 
and 
 Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
 and the  
Caribbean 
Middle 
East  
and North 
 Africa 
South 
 Asia 
N (Observations) 4463 389 516 826 1812 224 696 
n (MFIs) 832 78 102 152 319 37 144 
 
Table 2. Sample distribution by legal status. 
 Total Bank 
Credit Union / 
Cooperative 
NBFI NGO 
Rural 
Bank 
N (Observations) 4463 396 509 1553 1770 235 
n (MFIs) 832 66 110 278 325 53 
 
Table 3. MFIs in crisis by region and year. 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Africa 7.1% 7.1% 9.5% 8.3% 11.4% 11.3% 13.0% 2.9% 0.0% 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
5.6% 5.9% 9.8% 15.4% 13.8% 20.0% 12.3% 16.7% 9.1% 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
0.0% 2.5% 1.5% 0.9% 1.6% 4.2% 16.4% 14.9% 5.2% 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
2.6% 4.9% 6.7% 5.7% 7.0% 9.7% 13.1% 10.9% 5.9% 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.9% 13.9% 17.1% 12.1% 7.4% 0.0% 
South Asia 5.3% 6.9% 7.0% 6.9% 4.5% 7.8% 9.6% 11.7% 8.6% 
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Table 4. Variable definitions. 
Variable Description 
SIZE Size: log (total assets) 
LSIZE Loan size: log (gross loan portfolio / number of active borrowers) 
LIQ Liquidity: cash and banks / total assets 
DEPLOANS Deposits / gross loan portfolio 
YIELD 
Yield real: (yield on gross portfolio (nominal) – inflation rate ) / (1 + 
inflation rate) 
BORSTAFF 
Borrowers per staff: Log (number of active borrowers / number of 
personnel) 
ROA Return On Assets: (Net operating income – taxes) / average total assets 
REGION 
Dummy variables that identify the region of the MFI (Africa, East Asia 
and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and The 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia) 
GROWTH Annual growth in real GDP per capita (%) 
REMIT Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees (% GDP) 
CONCEN 
Concentration index: Herfindahl Hirschman Index (sum of the market 
shares of the MFIs squared). 
PCREDIT Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) 
STAB 
Political stability index: Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (-2.5 to 2.5) 
CORRUP Lack of corruption index: Control of corruption (-2.5 to 2.5) 
INFOR 
Private credit bureau coverage: Number of individuals and firms listed in 
a private credit bureau (% adult population) 
CRIGHTS Credit rights index: legal rights of borrowers and lenders (0 to 10) 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
SIZE 4463 16.075 1.774 10.682 22.267 
LSIZE 4463 6.311 1.300 -5.174 12.260 
LIQ 4463 0.154 0.125 -0.019 0.891 
DEPLOANS 4463 1.013 3.615 0.000 69.054 
YIELD 4463 0.248 0.168 -0.247 1.209 
BORSTAFF 4463 3.379 2.965 -0.707 16.276 
ROA 4463 0.017 0.086 -0.894 0.526 
GROWTH 4370 4.112 4.296 -16.586 33.030 
REMIT 4370 7.032 7.457 0.036 49.290 
CONCEN 4170 0.282 0.222 0.038 1.000 
PCREDIT 4170 34.181 17.448 2.839 161.980 
STAB 4170 -0.780 0.618 -2.474 1.163 
CORRUP 4170 -0.556 0.351 -1.525 0.709 
INFOR 3712 24.671 27.174 0.000 100.000 
CRIGHTS 3712 5.050 2.226 0.000 10.000 
Table 6. Correlation Matrix. 
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SIZE 1.000               
LSIZE 0.290 1.000              
LIQ 0.030 -0.168 1.000             
DEPLOANS 0.138 0.106 0.296 1.000            
YIELD -0.179 -0.252 0.091 -0.051 1.000           
BORSTAFF -0.092 0.278 0.060 0.094 -0.003 1.000          
ROA 0.172 0.102 -0.196 -0.050 0.040 -0.142 1.000         
GROWTH -0.001 -0.072 -0.049 -0.013 -0.119 -0.025 0.094 1.000        
REMIT 0.003 -0.084 0.041 -0.023 -0.071 -0.044 0.022 -0.211 1.000       
CONCEN -0.055 0.264 -0.055 -0.001 -0.023 0.190 -0.027 -0.021 -0.134 1.000      
PCREDIT 0.029 0.108 -0.078 -0.077 -0.240 -0.088 0.065 -0.037 0.114 0.164 1.000     
STAB -0.056 0.432 -0.146 -0.069 0.086 0.219 -0.008 -0.102 -0.094 0.401 0.151 1.000    
CORRUP 0.003 0.154 -0.091 -0.105 0.116 -0.004 0.024 -0.047 -0.178 0.022 0.283 0.370 1.000   
INFOR 0.058 0.259 -0.119 -0.081 0.259 0.010 -0.059 -0.247 -0.047 -0.076 0.033 0.307 0.344 1.000  
CRIGHTS 0.128 -0.112 0.063 -0.053 -0.049 -0.091 -0.018 0.093 -0.004 0.075 0.156 -0.107 0.128 -0.126 1.000 
Table 7. Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SIZE -0.078 -0.068 -0.097 -0.090 
 (-0.97) (-0.80) (-1.09) (-0.95) 
LSIZE 0.220* 0.160 0.219 0.178 
 (1.92) (1.07) (1.33) (1.02) 
LIQ 1.882** 1.457* 1.752** 1.750** 
 (2.54) (1.87) (2.15) (2.00) 
DEPLOANS 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.063** 0.072** 
 (3.10) (2.63) (2.39) (2.56) 
YIELD 0.196 0.178 0.724 1.096 
 (0.28) (0.23) (0.88) (1.25) 
BORSTAFF 0.068* 0.069* 0.079** 0.077* 
 (1.88) (1.85) (2.06) (1.93) 
ROA -11.763*** -11.864*** -12.390*** -12.379*** 
 (-10.18) (-9.59) (-9.62) (-9.15) 
REGION  10.36* 5.10 4.80 
GROWTH  -0.126*** -0.127*** -0.151*** 
 
 (-5.46) (-5.25) (-5.80) 
REMIT  -0.016 -0.019 0.003 
 
 (-0.77) (-0.74) (0.12) 
CONCEN   -0.150 -0.012 
 
  (-0.23) (-0.02) 
PCREDIT   0.013 0.011 
 
  (1.34) (1.06) 
STAB   -0.834*** -0.771** 
 
  (-2.97) (-2.58) 
CORRUP   -0.128 0.368 
 
  (-0.28) (0.75) 
INFOR    -0.014** 
 
   (-2.10) 
CRIGHTS    0.035 
 
   (0.46) 
CONSTANT -5.266 -4.154 -5.843 -5.609 
 (-3.90) (-2.87) (-3.60) (-3.17) 
N (Observations) 4463 4370 4170 3712 
N (MFIs) 832 812 783 753 
 LR chi2(16) 137.65 151.84 153.09 145.17 
 Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(***) indicates a level of significance of 0.01 (**) indicates a level of significance of 0.05 
(*) indicates a level of significance of 0.1 (t statistic between brackets) 
Region: Wald’s test of the joint significance of the region's dummy variables. Distributed as 
a chi-square under the null hypothesis of lack of relationship. 
 
